The "Spiral": Three moments

Introduction

In absolute sense, the starting point of doing theology is God/Jesus Christ. In a less concrete sense, we start with human experience. Context -- i.e., experience, class, change, culture, social location, solidarity, and struggle -- plays a crucial role in praxis theology. The three steps of moral justification include 1) EXPERIENCE/committed action, 2) REFLECTION (Analysis and Rereading the Bible, tradition), and 3) COMMITTED ACTION FOR CHANGE. In each cycle we expect to experience transformation, either either in the form of Personal Conversion/Personal advances/or positive change in the "quality of life" in the community -- social, economic, cultural, political, religious. Hence, praxis-oriented (contextual) theology. The purpose/goal of moral life is both teleological and eschatological. On the one hand, it is "teleological" in terms of achieving (through hard struggle and commitment) "this-worldly" ends, namely human advances/development -- both personal and communitarian. This end can also be understood in terms of liberation from social evils that cause human suffering and oppression. On the other hand, this end is understood as the gift of salvation and the fullness of creation in Christ; in other words, our pursuit towards shaping our moral life in the way Jesus Christ did it (i.e., loving service with a sense of option for the poor) is distinctly "eschatological," which is total salvation or eternal life with God.

To illustrate the dynamism of this theory of the "Spiral," 

Step 1

We had chosen ABORTION as the subject matter or moral issue in question. This is starting point: Abortion as the Experience/Committed Action. Students will be asked to DESCRIBE and GIVE FACTUAL INFORMATION about abortion, including statistics or numbers. We don't make any moral judgment iat this stage. Not yet. TELL us the story about this issue: human struggle, drama, conflict, as an inherent elements of abortion to situate ourselves (we are engaged in the life of the people involved). That is CONTEXT. In this phase, the information and the way you tell or describe the story can powerful enough to elicit or evoke some feelings of empathy or compassion, recognition and understanding, and anticipate a vision or desire for something in the future that is "liberating" or "freeing" experience. The focus should be that what's of reality.

Step 2

In this REFLECTION stage, right understanding emerges in the process as we see more closely the why's and how's of the issue. So we start we ANALYSIS, the critical observation of the context in tis totality in the light of Jesus' praxis in the gospel stories, and of course, the teaching of the Catholic Church, and the faith-experience of the common people (the latter, as moral criteria, could be contentious). I introduced to class one model of analysis, the WEB-CHART. This model, of course, does not promise complete understanding because our purpose is only to determine the possible its causes and effects, especially on the person and community in general. But given this limitation, at least, we learn something very important about the IMPACT of abortion. We recall that in classical ethics the process of moral justification is satisfied by focusing on the act as the material object of study. On the theoretical level, we justify this act (i.e., abortion) by providing sufficient reasons, which must be backed up by norms/moral standards, such RULES, PRINCIPLES, AND THEORY. Actions are justified by virtue of the power of reason or intelligence. Everything is cerebral. The "critic" need not be engaged in the episode. Contextual moral theology is different because the "critic" is engaged in the conversation, struggle, and the finding of solutions in the spirit of loving service and justice.

So we ask questions like, "Are human fetus human beings?" "Are they persons?" "Do they have any moral status or claim?" Well, some ethicians tried to answer this question by identifying "indicators" or criteria of humanhood. What does is mean to be human? Indicators: self-awareness, minimal intelligence, a sense of futurity, a sense of the past, communication, capability to relate to others, and so n and so forth. Truth is these "experts" of morality did not agree to which, how many should constitute the criteria for "distinctively human." From the looks of it, the FETUS or unborn child could not pass these criteria. But we agree that not biological make up constitutes the indicator of what is distinctively human, but something psychological. 

Some theological insights are needed to break the impasse, so to speak. Back to the question: "Is the fetus a human being?" If the answer is no, then what is it -- a tumor? We propose it is human. This is in anticipation for the question, "Is it morally right to take human life of an unborn child?" (The adjective "human" is right since the fetus is made by human parents.) Christian Faith informs that we are made in God's image, so is the fetus. The fetus "salvation" rest of being the image of God; the biological and psychological basis of "being human" can hardly extricate the fetus from puzzle. By "image" we mean the reality of relationships in the human community. We were created to relate; we are relationship beings; that is our image after God's. God is Trinity. God is a community of divine persons. So relationship is the criteria of humanhood. While still inside the mother's womb, the fetus already exercises relationship with the mother in love. The community also recognizes the fetus's special presence and "membership" on the simple ground that it provides and creates institutions tasked to give care to unborn children, like medical care centers, education, and even laws that protect the life of the unborn. Indeed, the human fetus is human, and well continue to grow and develop because it is recognized in such a complex social relationships that ensures human well-being of all members. The child has rights that other members enjoy, on account of its being human.

Why is abortion sought as means to remove difficulties? Some answers: deformed fetus due to Zika virus, inadvertently taking a fetus deforming drug, financial difficulties, victim of rape, psychological trauma, mental disorder, intrusiveness of a child, suicidal mentality of mother, and so on and so forth. Well, these reason EXPLAIN why abortion is commonly sought. But the question remains: Are these reasons sufficient enough to JUSTIFY abortion?

After having presented a critical analysis: causal effect analysis, analysis of humanhood from the perspective of ethics and theology, still, perhaps, one is not yet ready to make a well-informed MORAL JUDGMENT.

Let's see how the Bible sees the situation. Phase 2 under Step 2 (Reflection): REREADING THE BIBLE. The Bible does not discuss the morality of abortion. But the words and activities (praxis) of Jesus Christ will give us some insights on how God/Jesus Christ treat this issue.

Open the Bible to Mark 10:13ff. Blessing of the Children: And people were bringing children to him that he might touch them, but the disciples rebuked them. WhenJesus saw this he became indignant and said to them, "Let the children come to me; do not prevent them, for the kingdom of God belongs to such as these...Thenhe embraced them and blessed them, placing his hands on them.:

It is very clear that children (and fetuses) occupy a special place in the heart of Jesus.

(to be continued)

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Theo 131 Discussion Questions

H     Study the following questions.    1) In what possible ways the Gospel help shape and form our moral life and the way we pursue our commitment to love and justice? 2) Differentiate the goals of moral life from the two perspectives or belief systems --  classical philosophy versus contextual-praxis Christian theology. 3) Explain the reasons (or basis) why some ethicians believe fetuses (or zygotes) are nonperson/nonhuman, while many Catholics share different views. 4) Explain the link between “integral evangelization” and the "kingdom of God" in terms of personal advances and raising the level of life among Filipinos. 

EXODUS ROUTE MAPs

EXODUS ROUTE MAP

MAP OF UPPER AND LOWER EGYPT (ANCIENT)

UPPER AND LOWER EGYPT (ANCIENT)

(STUDENT'S REQUEST: This set of questions constitutes our last quiz in Theo 111. Some students have asked their teacher to publish it for study. So here it is.)

1. This ancient tribe were known to be descendants of  Shem: Hebrews, Akkadians, Phoenicians, and Arabs. Who were they?

[a] Canites             [b] Semites            [c] Turks

2. Which story forms the narrative link between the Hebrew ancestors and their sojourn in Egypt?

[a] Abraham           [b] Joseph               [c] Moses

3.  What story embodies God’s “Uncreation” narrative?

[a] Fall of Jericho    [b} Ten Plagues       [c] Deluge

4. What story narrates God’s “Second Creation”?

[a] Noah                  [b] Isaac                  [c] Eve

5. What is Hebrew toledot?

[a] creation story    [b] secret writings  [c] generation

6. Who was the Hebrew vizier to the Egyptian Pharaoh?

[a] Isaiah                 [b] Joseph               [c] Jacob

7. Who was Moses’ wife?

[a] Rebekah                            [b] Zipporah                [c] Dinah

8. Who was Jacob’s wife?

[a] Leah                   [b] Rachel               [c] Haggar

9. The literary source of creation story (Genesis 1)?

[a] P-source            [b]  Novelle-source                        [c] J-source

10. Who is the brother of Moses?

[a] Joshua               [b] Aaron                 [c] Haran

11. What is the ancient name of present-day Israel?

[a] Palestine           [b] Kenan                                [c] Sinai

12. Who is the third son of Adam?

[a] Ham                  [b] Shem                 [c] Seth

13. Which of them is not a Israelite?

[a] Esau          [b] Mary Magdalene       [c] Moses

14. Which son of Noah from whom Jesus Christ would come?

[a] Japhet                                [b] Ham                  [c] Shem

15. Common birthplace of King David and Jesus Christ?

[a] Edom                 [b] Judah                 [c] Nazareth

16. What Mesopotamian epic narrates the story of Flood?

[a] Enuma Elish      [b] Gilgamesh         [c] Atrahasis

17. Who was the founder of the Mesopotamian empire (Gen 10)?

[a] Nebucchadnezzar              [b] Nimrod              [c] Tao I

18. What the “sons of god” described in Gen 8:1-10?

[a] nephilin             [b] Philistines          [c] titans

19. They were Asiatic (Semitic) tribes who ruled Egypt sometime in 18^th century?

[a] Amorites           [b] Hyksos               [c] Ptolomies  

20. Identify, in their proper order, the Ten Plagues.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: The following article is lifted from Contemporary Issues In Bioethics, authored by Tom L. Beauchamp and LeRoy Walters, pp. 215-221. The article tries to present an ethical analysis on the issue of Abortion and Personhood as well as theoretical basis (grounding) for any moral judgment about the matter in question. As many would expect, a purely philosophical approach to the morality of abortion will have its own limitations. It would seem that such controversies surrounding the issue such as human life, person, and right "to take human life" will continue to persist, and debates involving opposing views of ethicians, more often than not, could not find "full rest," so to speak. If, however, any Christian-inspired theories can help bring about more appropriate ways of understanding the morality of abortion and its social implications, then they should be presented in a contextualized manner.)

     

ABORTION

THE PROBLEM OF JUSTIFICATION

Among the many reasons why abortions are commonly sought are cardiac complications, a suicidal condition of the mind, psychological trauma, pregnancy caused by rape, the inadvertent use of fetus-deforming drugs, and many personal and family reasons such as the financial burden or intrusiveness of a child. Such reasons certainly explain why abortions are often viewed as an available way to extricate a woman or a family from difficult circumstances. But the primary ethical issue remains: Are any such reasons sufficient to justify the act of aborting a human fetus? An ethicist concerned to defend abortion seeks a principled justification where ethical reasons are advanced for one’s conclusion. It might be decided, of course, that in only some of the above mentioned circumstances would an abortion be warranted, whereas in others it would not be justified. Even so, such a decision presupposes some set of general criteria that enables one to discriminate ethically justified abortions from ethically unjustified ones.

The central moral problem of abortion may be stated in woman to the following general form: Under what conditions, if any, is abortion ethically permissible? Some contend that abortion is never acceptable, or at most is permissible only if abortion is required to save the pregnant woman’s life or for some other similarly serious reasons. This view is commonly called the conservative theory of abortion. Roman Catholics have traditionally been among the leading exponents of the conservative approach, but they they are by no means its only advocates. Others hold that abortion is always permissible, whatever the state of fetal development. This view is commonly termed the liberal theory of abortion and has frequently been advocated by those adherents of women’s rights who emphasize the right of a woman to make decisions that affect her own body, but again the position is advocated by others as well. Finally, many defend intermediate or moderate theories, according to which abortion is ethically permissible up to a certain stage of fetal development or for some limited set of moral reasons that is sufficient to warrant the taking of fetal life  in this or that special circumstances.

FACTS OF HUMAN BIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

Pregnancy does not begin with intercourse, since the earliest point at which it can be dated is during the fertilization of the female egg (the ovum) by the sperm of the male. Once fertilization has occurred, a new genetic entity results from the combination of the genetic contributions of the male and the female. This new unit is a single cell capable, under normal conditions, of a constant process of alteration and growth. This single cell has twenty-three pairs of chromosomes (each parent contributes one chromosome in each pair). It quickly divides into two cells, four cells, then eight cells – reaching sixteen at approximately the third day after fertilization. Organ systems gradually appear before the eighth week of growth, roughly the point at which brain waves can be detected. Between approximately the nineteenth and twenty-eighth week of growth, the fetus reaches the stage known as “viability,” the point at which it is capable of survival outside the womb.

There exists a small but useful body of terminology frequently used by embryologists and others who discuss human biological development. Conception is said to occur when the male sperm and the female egg combine; during this process, the resultant entity is spoken of as a conceptus and is referred to in this way until its implantation, at the wall of the uterus. It is also referred to as a zygote until the completion of implantation, which occurs roughly two week after conception. Thereafter the term embryo is used to designate the developing entity, until about eight weeks, when it is referred to a fetus. However, the term “fetus” is frequently used to designate the unborn entity in any state of development.

THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE FETUS

Recent controversies about abortion focus on ethical problems of how we ought and ought not to treat fetuses and on what rights, if any, are possessed by fetuses. But a more basic issue is that of what kind of entities fetuses are. Following current usage, we shall refer to this as the problem of ontological status. An account of what kind of entities fetuses are will, of course, have important implications for all issues of the permissible treatment of fetuses. But the two issues are distinct, and we must first attempt to resolve the preliminary question.

Although there is no single problem of ontological status, several layers of questions may be distinguished: (1) whether the fetus is an individual organism, (2) whether the fetus is biologically a human being, (3) whether the fetus is psychologically a human being, and (4) whether the fetus is a person. Some who write on problems of ontological status attempt to develop a theory that specifies the conditions under which the fetus can be said, under which the fetus is in some sense human, and still others are concerned to explain the conditions, if any, under which the fetus is a person. It would be generally agreed that one attributes a more significant status to the fetus by saying that it is fully human being rather than simply saying that it is an individual organism, and also that one enhances its status still further by claiming that it is a person.

Many would be willing to concede tha an individual life begins at fertilization without conceding that there is a human being or a person at fertilization. Others would upgrade the fetus’s status by claiming that the fetus is a human being at fertilization, but not a person. Still others would grant full personhood at fertilization. Those who spouse these views sometimes differ only because they define one of the other of these terms differently, but most of the differences come from serious theoretical disagreement about what constitutes either life or humanity or personhood, including disagreements over which category correctly applies to the fetus.

THE CONCEPT OF HUMANITY

The concept of human life is an especially perplexing one, for it can mean at least two very different things. On the one hand, it can mean (a) biological human life, that set of biological classificatory characteristics (e.g., genetic ones) that set the human species apart from nonhuman species. (This sense may be coextensive with “individual organism.”) On the other hand, “human life” can also be used to mean (b) life that is distinctively human – that is, a life that is characterized by those properties which define the essence of humanity. These are largely psychological, as contrasted with biological properties. It is often said, for example, that the ability to use symbols, to imagine, to love, and to perform various higher intellectual skills are the most distinctive human properties, those that define humans as human. To have these properties, we sometimes say, it is to be a “human being.”

To illustrate the differences between these two sense. Infants with various exotic diseases are often born and die after a short period of time. They are born of human parents and certainly are classified in all relevant biological ways as human. However, they never exhibit any distinctively human traits, and do not have the potential for doing so. For such individuals it is not possible to make human life in the “biological” sense human in the “distinctively human” or “psychological” sense. We do not differentiate these two levels of life in discourse about any other animal species. We do not, for example, speak of making feline life feline. But we do meaningfully speak of making human life human, and this usage makes sense precisely because there exists in the language the dual meaning just discussed. In discussions of abortion, it is imperative that one be specific about which meaning is being employed when using an expression like the “taking of human life.” A great many proponents of abortion, and opponents as well, would agree that while biological life is taken by abortion, human life in the second or psychological sense is not.

THE CONCEPT OF PERSONHOOD

Personhood may or may not be different from either the biological sense or the psychological sense of “human life” just discussed. That is, one might claim that what it means to be a person is simply to have some properties that make an organism human in one or both of these senses. But other writers have suggested a list of rather more demanding criteria for being a person. A list of conditions for being person, similar to the following, is advanced by Mary Anne Warren in this chapter and has been put forward by several recent writers:

(a)    consciousness

(b)   self-consciousness

(c)    freedom to act on one’s own reasons

(d)   capacity to communicate with other persons

(e)   capacity to make moral judgments

(f)     rationality

          Sometimes it is said by those who propose such a list that in order to be a person an entity need only satisfy one criterion on the list – e.g., it must be conscious (a) but need not also satisfy the other conditions (b-f). Others say that all of these conditions must be satisfied in order to be a person. We shall see that it makes a major difference which of these two views one accepts. But the dominant and prior question is whether one needs to accept anything like this list at all – a question raised in the present chapter by Philip Devine and (at least elliptically) by Baruch Brody.

          Two issues have emerged concerning the proper analysis of the concept of person. First, there is considerable dispute concerning the range of factual characteristics an entity must possess in order to be a person. One might analyze personhood n terms of a rather abbreviated list of factual, though not necessarily biological characteristics – e.g., in terms of physical characteristics such as genetic structure, characteristics of consciousness such as rationality and free choice, and perhaps characteristics that can at present be applied only to human developmental histories such as having learned a language. If personhood can be explicated in this way by listing only elementary properties, such as genetic structure, then fetuses might well qualify as persons. But one might also analyze personhood in terms of a more demanding list of presumably factual properties, such as b-f above. Clearly one would be under a heavy burden of argument to show that a fetus is a person if criteria such as these must be satisfied. In any event, the first controversy is over precisely this issue of whether any of these more demanding properties must be present in order to be a person, and if so which such properties.

          A second dispute has emerged in connection with the first one. Several writers have suggested that the concept of personhood must be analyzed in terms of properties bestowed by human evaluations well as in terms of fatual properties possessed by persons. For example, it has been argued that in order to be a person one must be the bearer of legal rights and social responsibilities, and must be capable of being judged by others as morally praiseworthy or blameworthy. The central question in this controversy is whether ftuses are the sort of entity that it is appropriate to value in this way. This issue is closely related to what we shall discuss momentarily as the moral status of the fetus.

  It is certainly not self-evident that a fetus either is or is not a person in any of the above senses. Anyone who claims to have resolved these controversies about persons must be prepared either to defend a particular theory of personhood or to show that these issues have somehow been wrongly conceived.

          The problem of ontological status is complicated by a further factor related to the biological development of the fetus. It is important to state at what point of development an entity is to be distinguished as fully individual, or fully human, or fully person. This involves specifying at what point full ontological status and only indirectly concerns what status they have.

THE MORAL STATUS OF THE FETUS

          The notion of moral status might be explicated in several ways but probably is most easily understood in abortion contexts in terms of rights. Accordingly, to say that a fetus possesses moral status is to say that it possesses rights. But which rights, if any? Conservatives hold that unborn fetuses possess the same rights as those who are born and therefore have full moral status. Devine and Brody hold such a thesis for at least most stages of fetal development.          At least some moderates contend that fetuses have only some rights and therefore have only a partial moral status. Liberals, on the other hand, maintain that fetuses possess no rights and therefore no moral status, as Warren maintains. If this liberal account is accepted, then the unborn have no more right to life than a bodily cell or a tumor, and an abortion would seem to be no more morally objectionable than surgery to remove the tumor. On the other hand, if the conservative account is accepted, then the unborn possess all the rights possessed by other human beings, and an abortion would appear to be objectionable as any common killing – except perhaps those killings committed in self-defense.

          Theories of moral status are usually closely connected with theories of ontological status. The conservative holds that since the line between the human and the nonhuman must be drawn at conception, the fetus as full ontological status and therefore full moral status. The liberal may contend that since the line between the human and nonhuman must be drawn at birth, the fetus has no significant ontological status and therefore no moral status.